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Abstract
With the emergence of inexpensive network components and high-speed network services, a variety of network-capable
electronic devices have become available. Typical examples of such devices include printers, network access storage (NAS),
and video recorders. Because software on these devices is not always kept up-to-date, the devices are susceptible to intra-local-
area-network (LAN) attacks. In this paper, a novel network system architecture is proposed to protect network devices from
intra-LAN attacks by dynamically isolating infected devices with OpenFlow. Preliminary evaluation results demonstrate that
the architecture is eﬀective in actual LAN environments.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
Keywords: Network security; IDS; OpenFlow; Isolation
1. Introduction
The emergence of inexpensive network components and high-speed network services has led to a variety
of network-capable electronic devices becoming available. Typical network-capable examples include printers,
network access storage (NAS), and video recorders. The embedded software used in these devices is generally
developed on an operating system (OS), such as Linux, ITRON, [1] andWindows family. In a survey of embedded
systems published by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japanese goverment,, the top three
target OSs and their respective share are (1) ITRON (22.5%), (2) Linux (15.9%), and (3) Windows family (20.0%),
as shown in Fig.1.
In addition to the usage of an OS, middleware is also widely used for development of the network devices.
Fig.2 shows a part of another survey published by MITI, indicating that more than 60% of embedded systems
deploy network protocol as well as device drivers. This means that the software for network devices heavily relies
on middleware manufactured by other software vendors.
Because network devices are constructed using an OS and existing middleware products, the most crucial
security issue is that of updating the network device software. Updating the software can be made diﬃcult if
the time required to update the device is high. While it is often possible for users to update both the OS and
middleware over the Internet, users are generally unconcerned about updating the devices.
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Fig. 1. Target OS. Fig. 2. Middleware used.
Another reason that devices are not updated is because vendors eventually terminate their support services.
The lack of support means that update patches are no longer available for a product line even though some of the
devices are still in use.
Once an insecure network device is attacked, the device can be used as a springboard to attack other computers.
Devices operating within a local area network (LAN) are usually protected from external threats due to the use
of ﬁrewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDSs). However, an insecure network device can allow attackers to
conduct an intra-LAN attack against computers inside the LAN, eﬀectively bypassing ﬁrewalls and IDSs. In
this paper, we propose a novel network system architecture that protects network devices from intra-LAN attacks
by dynamically isolating infected devices using OpenFlow. Our preliminary evaluation results show that the
architecture is eﬀective in actual LAN environments.
In this paper, we propose a novel type of network system architectures for preventing network devices from
an intra-LAN attack, by dynamically isolating an infected device from intra-LAN by using OpenFlow [2] on
detection. Our preliminary evaluation results show that our architecture is eﬀective and applicable in actual LAN
environment.
2. Motivation
2.1. Network Device Vulnerabilities
Here, we describe some vulnerabilities that have been observed with actual network devices.
• First, Cross Site Request Forgeries (CSRF), were found in several broadband router pruducts designed and
manufactured by multiple vendors in 2008 and in 2011 (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures(CVE-
2008-0524) 1 and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures(CVE-2011-1324) 2 . With these CSRF, a broad-
band router conﬁguration can be modiﬁed from outside the LAN to cause more severe damages.
1http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0524
2http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-1324
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• Secondly, a Samba vulnerability was found in 2012 that aﬀects NAS devices (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures(CVE-2012-1182) 3 . This vulnerability allows the NAS to be controlled with root permissions.
root permissions allow any program to be executed on the NAS that acceses computers inside the LAN.
• Finally, a vulnerability was found in 2004 (Japan Vulnerability Notes(jvn50505257) 4, that allows attackers
to obtain full access control over an insecure video recorder without authentication. Attackers can use the
recorder as a springboard to perform attacks on other computers within the LAN.
The above vulnerabilities are only representative examples of a much larger number of hidden vulnerabilities
in network devices. There are three kinds of problems that hinder addressing vulnerabilities even after they are
found.
• No support for update patches: When a device vendor terminates support, update patches may no longer be
available.
• Delay in release of update patches: Even if the device is currently supported, the vendor may not release an
update immediately after the vulnerability is found. From a JPCERT/CC survey in Oct. 2012 [3], only 667
out of 7050 software vulnerabilities were addressed by update patches. The report also indicated that only
57% of update patches are released within 90 days of the vulnerability notiﬁcation.
• User reluctance to install update patches: The network device user may be reluctant to apply an update
patch to the device due to time constraints. The user may additionally be concerned that the update patch
could result in device instability.
2.2. Intra-LAN Security
In this paper, we describe a scenario on intra-LAN security using a representative example that includes the
vulnerabilities explained above. First, an attacker uses a CSRF vulnerability to modify the broadband device that
allows a more severe attack to be performed against devices within the LAN. The attacker then executes a program
on an NAS that destroys the NAS contents. Finally, the attacker moves on to attack other devices and computers
within the LAN via the NAS.
If any network device is insecure, the entire LAN may be compromised. Even if a router eﬀectively protects
the LAN from external attacks, downloaded ﬁles, USB memory sticks, or external disks can potentially allow
attacks from within the LAN. Once the LAN is compromised, intra-LAN attacks can result in substantial damage.
In this paper, a new network system architecture is proposed that protects network devices from intra-LAN
attacks. The architecture dynamically isolates infected devices using OpenFlow.
3. Related Work
Xiong Liu et al. described an OpenFlow-based network system to implement a multi-level security policy that
controls communication between multiple network hosts [4]. They suggested a method to restrict information
ﬂow from a high-security-level host to a low-security-level host. Although they used an OpenFlow-based secure
network, the proposed network does not support intrusion detection or isolation of unsecured devices. Kai Wang
et al. proposed a scalable network management architecture called LiveSec that used a new access switching layer
[5]. The LiveSec architecture used both interactive policy enforcement and distributed load balancing, and it was
implemented with OpenFlow-enabled switches. Although LiveSec is a novel network management architecture
with a high-security policy deﬁnition, isolation of insecure devices needs to be executed manually due to the
unavailability of an automatic device isolation function.
Y. V. Srinivasa Murthy et al. proposed a new approach to trace and solve security attacks in LANs [6]. Their
system detects worms or other malicious information and stops them from spreading within the LAN. Their
system adds special rules to an IDS such as SNORT. However, their approach only focuses on worm detection
and removal, which is not eﬀective for other types of intrusions. Udaya Tupakula et al. proposed a new secure
3http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1182
4http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVNE7DDE712/
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network infrastructure called TVLAN [7]. The approach combines two existing technologiestrusted computing
and virtualization. In TVLAN, all clients and hosts are connected within a virtual and trusted network. This type
of network can easily avoid ﬂooding attacks; however, it is assumed that a virtual machine manager (VMM) is
installed on each client, which reduces the applicability of the network architecture. Li Li et al. proposed the use
of a virtual honeypot for LAN security [8]. The virtual honeypot protects servers in the LAN from outside attacks.
After an intrusion is identiﬁed, the system changes the iptables to minimize the eﬀects of an attack. It is not clear,
however, whether the honeypot concept can be used to detect and isolate an intra-LAN attack.
Masaaki Sato et al. proposed a new method for anomaly-based IDSs [9]. With the proposed method, unknown
attacks can be detected by adding alert features and incorporating a class support vector machine. S. M. Hussein
et al. also proposed a hybrid IDS approach that combines the signature-based and anomaly-based IDSs. With this
combination, highly accurate detection can be achieved with very few false positives. The architecture proposed
in this paper does not require specialized IDSs. Any existing IDS can be used in the proposed architecture. It
is important, therefore, to use an IDS that will provide highly accurate detection with a low false-positive rate to
increase the detection ability of the proposed secure network architecture.
4. Architecture
In this section, we describe our new architecture to protect network devices from intra-LAN attack.
4.1. Basic Concepts
Fig.3 shows the basic concepts described here. As shown in this ﬁgure, we focus on a network structure within
the LAN. In order to protect network devices from an intra-LAN attack, a new architecture is proposed to control
intra-LAN packet forwarding in combination with an IDS. The following basic concepts apply to the proposed
architecture.
• Employment of OpenFlow as software switches: OpenFlow is used to change the network conﬁguration dy-
namically. OpenFlow is a Software-Deﬁned Network (SDN) software package that enables networks to be
software-controlled. OpenFlow allows network switches to be conﬁgured using programmable interfaces.
The SDN software package also allows network traﬃc to be monitored, including inspecting and routing of
packets, which is important for the intra-LAN secure network realization.
• Intra-LAN intrusion detection with existing IDS: IDS typically monitors network traﬃc packets to detect
an intrusion from outside the LAN. We employ the IDS to detect and identify an insecure network device
that may cause malicious activities. It is not assumed in this concept that a speciﬁc IDS is used. Any IDS
can be used in the proposed architecture
• Isolation of an insecure network device: Once an insecure network device is identiﬁed with the IDS, the
device should be isolated from the network immediately. The rapid isolation of such a device is important
to keep the network secure from further attack.
• Devices such as NAS, routers, video recorders or printers, in addition to PCs, can be supported in our
architecture. As described in the introduction section, it is important to assume that a device, in which
its driver is neither easily nor frequently updated, is connected to LAN. It is not practical to realize late
installation of a software component in a device to keep the device more secure. A insecure device should
be isolated without any software installation.
4.2. Structure
Fig.4 shows the structure of the novel network architecture proposed in this paper. As shown in Fig.4, the
structure is composed of three components: OpenFlow switch, OpenFlow Controller, and IDS. The OpenFlow
switch is a packet transfer switch based on the OpenFlow protocol. This component can be controlled by another
component called an OpenFlow Controller. The OpenFlow Controller is a component that controls the OpenFlow
switch by changing the conﬁguration based on the LAN information database and messages from the IDS. The
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Fig. 3. Basic concept.
Fig. 4. Structure.
IDS is used for monitoring network traﬃc, detecting attacks, and identifying insecure devices. The IDS also sends
alert messages to the OpenFlow Controller.
The OpenFlow Controller has the three additional functions: packet forwarding check, device isolation, and
path selection. In the packet forwarding check, the source and the destination of each packet are checked against
the LAN information database to determine whether the packet should be forwarded. The device isolation function
is activated when an alert message is sent from the IDS. This function isolates the identiﬁed device. The last
function, path selection, selects a path for packet forwarding based on the packet forwarding check function. The
path deﬁnition and policies deﬁning how the path is selected are described in the next.
In this paper, it is assumed that the architecture can be implemented for a small or a medium scale LAN which
is composed of the one or two-digit number of LAN devices. We also assumed that the speed of the LAN is
100Mbps. These assumptions are made for implementing the architecture.
4.3. Paths and policies for path selection
Path types are segregated into the following two categories: (1) IDS-ﬁrst and (2) Forwarding-ﬁrst. In the IDS-
ﬁrst category, the packet is ﬁrst sent to IDS and waits for processing at the IDS, whereas in the Forwarding-ﬁrst
category, the packet is copied and concurrently sent to both the IDS and its destination.
There are ﬁve policies for path selection. The policies are COMPLETE,
HIGH SECURED, MEDIUM, HIGH PERFORMANCE, and BASIC.
• COMPLETE policy: All packets are transferred to IDS ﬁrst. This policy results in the highest security
possible.
• HIGH SECURED policy: This policy is introduced to perform secure packet switching with consideration
given to switching performance. Either Forwarding-ﬁrst or IDS-ﬁrst is executed for a packet. The path is
selected based on a predeﬁned probability, α. Speciﬁcally, IDS-ﬁrst is selected in the probability of α, while
Forwarding-ﬁrst is selected in the probability of 1 − α. The value of α is set and used in the range from 0.5
to 1.0 in this policy.
• MEDIUM policy: Either of the two path types, Forwarding-ﬁrst or IDS-ﬁrst, is selected at random in this
policy.
• HIGH PERFORMANCE policy: This policy is introduced to achieve high packet switching performance
with consideration given to security. Either Forwarding-ﬁrst or IDS-ﬁrst is executed for a packet. The
selected path is opposite that of the HIGH SECURED policy. Forwarding-ﬁrst is selected in the probability
of α, while IDS-ﬁrst is selected in the probability of 1 − α. The value of α is set and used in the range from
0.0 to 0.5 in this policy.
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• BASIC policy: Both packet forwarding and packet checking at IDS are executed in parallel in this policy.
Since no overhead is expended for IDS, this policy results in the highest performance. Due to the delay,
however, a situation can arise wherein a malicious action occurs prior to intrusion detection.
Fig.5 describes these policies in the form of algorithms.
First, the received packet P is checked using the databaseWHITE LIS T . If either the destination or the source
of packet P is found in the WHITE LIS T , then Forwarding-ﬁrst(P) is executed. In Forwarding-ﬁrst(P), the packet
is directly transferred to the destination and a copy of the packet is transferred to the IDS. The WHITE LIS T is
manually prepared by a network administrator. If the packet is not found in the WHITE LIS T , then it is checked
against BLACK LIS T . If either the destination or source of packet P is found in BLACK LIS T , then the packet
is discarded with discard PACKET(P). If neither the source nor destination is found in the WHITE LIS T or
BLACK LIS T databases, the deﬁned policy is used to determine path selection.
If the BASIC policy is deﬁned, Forwarding-ﬁrst(P) is performed for all packets after checking WHITE LIS T
and BLACK LIS T . In the HIGH PERFORMANCE policy, path SELECTED(P, α) outputs either ”Forwarding-
ﬁrst” or ”IDS-ﬁrst” depending on the given probability of α value. If ”Forwarding-ﬁrst” is output, then Forwarding-
ﬁrst(P) is executed. Otherwise, IDS-ﬁrst(P) is executed. In the MEDIUM policy, either ”Forwarding-ﬁrst”
or ”IDS-ﬁrst” is selected at random. In the HIGH SECURED policy, the same process is executed as in the
HIGH PERFORMANCE policy but a diﬀerent probability value is used, α. In the ﬁnal policy, COMPLETE,
IDS-ﬁrst(P) is executed anytime a packet is sent.
1 / / α : a p a t h s e l e c t i o n pa r ame t e r , can be changed by a ne twork admin .
2 / / POLICY : t h e p o l i c y d e f i n e d by a ne twork admin
3 g e t P a c k e t ( P )
4 i f ( check WHITELIST ( P ) i s TRUE)
5 t h en do Forward ing − f i r s t ( P )
6 e l s e
7 i f ( i f ( check BLACKLIST ( P ) i s TRUE)
8 t h en discard PACKET (P )
9 e l s e
10 c a s e POLICY
11 of ”BASIC ” :
12 do Forward ing − f i r s t ( P )
13 of ”HIGH PERFORMANCE” :
14 i f ( path SELECTED (P , α ) i s ” Forward ing − f i r s t ” )
15 t h en do Forward ing − f i r s t ( P )
16 e l s e do IDS− f i r s t ( P )
17 e n d i f
18 o f ”MEDIUM” :
19 i f ( path SELECTED (P , 0 . 5 ) i s ” Forward ing − f i r s t ” )
20 t h en do Forward ing − f i r s t ( P )
21 e l s e do IDS− f i r s t ( P )
22 e n d i f
23 o f ”HIGH SECURED” :
24 i f ( path SELECTED (P , α ) i s ” IDS− f i r s t ” )
25 t h en do IDS− f i r s t ( P )
26 e l s e do Forward ing − f i r s t ( P )
27 e n d i f
28 o f ”COMPLETE” :
29 do IDS− f i r s t ( P )
30 endca se
31 e n d i f
32 e n d i f
Fig. 5. Policies for path selection
It should be noted that in spite of the policy selection all the packets received are sent to the IDS for intrusion
detection process. The diﬀerence lies in the time when a packet is sent to the IDS. In COMPLETE policy, all the
packets are sent to the IDS and not sent to the target device before the result from the IDS is obtained, while all the
packets are sent to both the IDS and the target device simultaneously in BASIC policy. There are no diﬀerences
on the capability of the insecure device isolation. The time on device isolation after detecting intrusions diﬀers for
policies.
5. Evaluations
In this section, we describe our experiments and the experimental results to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and
the usability of our proposed architecture.
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5.1. Set-up
The following environment and conﬁguration were used to conduct our experiments.
• Open vSwitch [12]: We used Open vSwitch as a software conﬁgurable network switch in our experimental
system.
• Linux and kvm: Debian GNU/Linux 6.0 is run on an HP ML110G7 with a Xeon R31220 3.1GHz processor
with 8GB of memory. The virtual machine environment, kvm, is used to conduct our experiments. Twenty
virtual machines are initiated, including four virtual machines for IDSs. The LAN speed used in the ex-
periments is set to 100Mbps. Our kvm parameter settings are shown in Table 1. The reason for the use
of the virtual machine environment is that physical network interface overhead should be avoided in our
simulation.
• Snort [13]: Snort, an open intrusion prevention and detection system, is used for the IDS in our experimental
system. Although Snort supports the statefull inspection capability, any other IDS can be used instead of
Snort. It is because we only IDS intrusion detection function by sending all the received packets to the IDS
and by receiving an alert from the IDS.
• No BLACKLIST and no WHITELIST: To focus on the main body of the process shown in Fig.5, neither
BLACKLIST nor WHITELIST, is used in our experiments.
Our experimental system is written in Python. The POX library [14] was used for OpenFlow Controller develop-
ment.
The evaluation measures are throughput and round trip time (RTT). Both measures are frequently used for
the network evaluation. Throughput is a measure of the average message transfer rate per unit time. RTT is the
average time required for a message to transfer from a source to a destination over the network and then return an
acknowledge message to the sender.
We check the throughput and RTT using Iperf and ping commands, respectively. The 16 virtual machines are
decomposed into eight groups, each consisting of two machines. The number of simultaneous message transfer
groups, is changed in the range of one to eight. To model devices other than PCs, each virtual machine only
sends packets and receives packets using TCP/IP. A total of 60 values were obtained over a 1-min interval in one
measurement. Five measurements were made and averaged for both RTT and throughput.
5.2. Experiments
We conducted the following experiments to evaluate the proposed architecture.
• EXP-alpha:The purpose of the ﬁrst experiment, EXP-alpha, is to check the eﬀect of α values on throughput.
We measure the throughput for α value in the range from 0.0 to 1.0.
• EXP-throughput: The purpose of this EXP-throughput experiment is to check both the eﬀect of a policy and
the number of concurrent connections on throughput. We used the policies: HIGH SECURED, MEDIUM
and HIGH PERFORMANCE.
• EXP-RTT: The purpose of the last experiment, EXP-RTT, is to check both the eﬀect of a policy and the
number of connections on RTT. In this experiment, we also used the same three policies as in the EXP-
throughput experiment.
Table 1. kvm parameter settings.
RAM Disk Size Vcpus Network Model OS-type hvm
(Mem size in one VM) (Disk size in one VM) (Num. of CPU in one VM) (NIC model used) (OS in VM) (Full Virtualization)
512MB 10GB 1 virtio linux yes
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5.3. EXP-alpha
The result of the EXP-alpha experiment is shown in Fig.6.
In Fig.6, the MAX curve of the throughput is shown as a function of the α value. The MAX curve is obtained
using the following equation: MAX (bit/s) = TCP window size (bit) / RTT (s). A TCP window size of 16 KB
was used in combination with RTT values obtained from the EXP-RTT experiment. From this ﬁgure, we can
observe that the alpha value with the smallest throughput diﬀerence between the ideal case and measured values
is 0.78. Therefore, the α value for HIGH SECURED and HIGH PERFORMANCE should be set to 78%. We
can also observe that a 30-Mbps diﬀerence can be observed between the throughput value at α = 1.0 (65 Mbps
with the COMPLETE policy) and the value at α = 0.0 (95 Mbps with the BASIC policy). When a network
administrator selects a policy such as BASIC or HIGH PERFORMANCE, the overhead is relatively low, resulting
in throughputs of 85 to 95 Mbps in a 100 Mbps LAN. The maximum overhead observed, approximately 32%, is
associated with the most secure intra-LAN realization. This overhead is mainly caused by the use of the IDS. To
improve performance, either a lower overhead IDS should be selected or the IDS should be combined with our
OpenFlow-based framework.
Fig. 6. EXP-alpha result: eﬀect of α values on throughput.
Fig. 7. EXP-throughput result: eﬀect of a policy on throughput.
5.4. EXP-throughput
The result of the EXP-throughput experiment is shown in Fig.7.
As shown in this Fig.7, the throughput values vary with the selected policy. HIGH PERFORMANCE indicates
the best throughput among the policies considered, followed by MEDIUM, and then HIGH SECURED. Based
on the policy deﬁnitions, the observed order is to be expected. All policies produce consistent throughput values
when the number of concurrent connections is four or less. When ﬁve or more concurrent connections are present,
throughput values decrease. The reason for this trend is that four IDS machines were used and the machine load
is well distributed for up to four connections. The IDS machine load becomes larger when more than ﬁve current
connections are established, however. Additional investigation on the IDS load and smart load balancing methods
remain to be performed.
5.5. EXP-RTT
The results of the EXP-RTT experiment are shown in Fig.8. In this ﬁgure, the eﬀect of alpha value selection
is shown on the left (a) and the eﬀect of policy selection is shown on the right (b).
It can be seen from Fig.8(a) that the RTT value increases linearly with alpha. In the case of α = 0.0 (BA-
SIC), the RTT value is 0.8 ms, whereas the RTT value is 1.45 ms in the case of α = 1.0 (COMPLETE). The
diﬀerence in RTT between the COMPLETE and BASIC policies, 0.65 ms, is negligible. For the results shown
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in Fig.8(b), the HIGH SECURED policy results in the highest average RTT, followed by the MEDIUM and
HIGH PERFORMANCE policies. The fact that the HIGH PERFORMANCE policy produces the lowest average
RTT agrees well with results from the EXP-throughput experiment; in contrast, the RTT value is not dependent
on the number of connections. Therefore, the proposed architecture can be used to realize a secure intra-LAN.
Fig. 8. EXP-RTT results (a) eﬀect of an alpha value; (b) eﬀect of a policy.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel network system architecture to protect network devices from an intra-LAN
attack by dynamically isolating infected devices using OpenFlow. The key aspects of our architecture are (1)
OpenFlow switches are used to isolate infected devices, and (2) any existing IDS can be used to detect an intra-
LAN intrusion. Five security policy levels are deﬁned that allow network administrators to strike a balance be-
tween network performance and security. We conducted experiments to evaluate the architecture and show that
the architecture is eﬀective in an actual LAN environment. The main feature of our proposed architecture is that
any network device other than PCs can be supported and isolated on intrusion detections in the device without
installation of any additional software component in it beforehand.
There are many issued to be solved, such as 1) adaptable security level speciﬁcation, 2) realization of more
ﬂexible and detailed security control, 3) development of a security management front-end for simpliﬁed operations
by network administrators, 4) ﬁeld-testing in actual networks. and 5) extending our architecture for a large scale
LAN.
Especially, we plan to develop a method for automatic security policy control adaptable for LAN security
contexts. Although we described ﬁve policies in our paper, the network administrator needs to specify a policy
among them depending on the current security control situation. Even one of the policies is used, there is no
guarantee for the policy to be eﬀective in the future. As he or she is diﬃcult to set the policy dynamically, an
automatic or adaptable security policy control is necessary to be developed. We are currently developing two
methods to realize the adaptable security policy control, which are score-based and rule-based methods. In the
former method, the highest-score policy among scores calculated for each of the policies is selected. The latter
enables to determine the policy, dynamically checking a set of policy control rules which are generated beforehand
from a large collections of network logs containing packet headers and IDS alert information. We intend to present
these methods in the near future.
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